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Non-technical summary 
This paper focuses on barriers to entry, firm profitability and the number of firms in a market. 
Usually, it is expected that high profits attract entry, which is particularly important if the 
highly profitable firm has a dominant position and holds a large market share. In light of the 
mechanisms by which markets adjust, the absence of barriers to entry is fundamental for eco-
nomic welfare. It is necessary that a situation of considerable market power with high profits 
attracts entry by challengers and that by this intensification of the competitive pressure the 
profits adjust to a “normal” level.  
Baumol et al. (1982) find that market performance depends in an essential way on the impor-
tance of potential entry. The problem this raises for econometric work is that potential entry is 
an unobservable variable. Usually, the effects of entry are identified by the realized entry of 
challengers. Using survey-based data, we are able to investigate the effect of the threat of en-
try. Information from top managers, on their perception of how strong their own competitive 
position is threatened by a likely entry of competitors into their main markets, is applied to 
estimate what effect this threat of entry has on profitability. We confirm that threat of entry 
has a disciplinary effect on the price-setting behaviour of firms; we find a significant negative 
effect of threat of entry on firm profitability. 
In a second step, we derive a theoretical model linking the optimal number of firms in a mar-
ket to fixed costs. Fixed costs should, at least partly, reflect sunk costs which are assumed to 
build a barrier to entry. The model predicts that the number of firms in a market depends 
negatively on fixed and marginal costs. We test this model empirically and confirm the con-
jectured effects. Furthermore, we test whether firms cut prices to such an extent that entry is 
not profitable. Since threat of entry turns out to have no significant effect on the number of 
competitors, we can confirm that the cut of prices is sufficient to prevent entry. 
  
Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
Diese Studie betrachtet Markteintrittsbarrieren, Unternehmensprofitabilität und die Anzahl 
von Unternehmen in einem Markt. Üblicherweise wird angenommen, dass hohe Gewinne 
Markteintritt hervorrufen, was insbesondere wichtig ist, wenn hochprofitable Unternehmen 
eine dominante Position und einen großen Marktanteil innehaben. In Bezug auf die Marktme-
chanismen ist das Fehlen von Markteintrittsbarrieren wichtig für die Wohlfahrt. Es ist unab-
dingbar, dass in einer Situation beträchtlicher Marktmacht einhergehend mit hohen Gewinnen 
Markteintritt möglich ist und dass sich durch die Intensivierung des Wettbewerbsdrucks die 
Gewinne wieder auf ein „normales“ Niveau einpendeln. 
Baumol et al. (1982) zeigen, dass die Marktperformance wesentlich von der Bedeutung von 
potenziellem Markteintritt abhängt. In ökonometrischen Studien wirft dies das Problem auf, 
dass potenzieller Markteintritt nicht beobachtbar ist. Üblicherweise wird dieser Effekt über 
sich tatsächlich manifestierten Markteintritt approximiert. Wir sind hingegen in der Lage, 
durch Nutzung von Unternehmensbefragungen den Effekt von Markteintrittsdrohungen zu 
analysieren. Informationen von Unternehmensmanagern bzgl. ihrer Wahrnehmung, wie stark 
die eigene Wettbewerbsposition durch einen wahrscheinlichen Eintritt von Wettbewerbern in 
ihrem Hauptabsatzmarkt bedroht ist, werden verwendet, um den Effekt zu schätzen, inwieweit 
die Profitabilität durch Markteintrittsdrohung beeinflusst wird. Wir können den disziplinie-
rende Effekt von Markteintrittsdrohung auf das Preissetzungsverhalten der Unternehmen bes-
tätigen, da wir einen signifikant negativen Effekt der Markteintrittsdrohung auf die Profitabi-
lität finden. 
In einem zweiten Schritt leiten wir ein theoretisches Modell her, das die optimale Anzahl von 
Unternehmen in einem Markt mit Fixkosten verbindet. Fixkosten sollten zumindest teilweise 
Sunk Costs abbilden, die als Markteintrittsbarriere angesehen werden. Das Modell sagt vor-
her, dass die Anzahl der Unternehmen in einem Markt negativ von fixen und marginalen Kos-
ten abhängt. Wir testen dieses Modell empirisch und können die theoretisch abgeleiteten Ef-
fekte bestätigen. Darüber hinaus, testen wir, ob Unternehmen ihre Preise so stark reduzieren, 
dass Markteintritt nicht profitabel ist. Da die Markteintrittsdrohung keinen signifikanten Ef-
fekt auf die Anzahl der Unternehmen hat, können wir bestätigen, dass die Preissenkungen 
ausreichend sind, um Markteintritt zu verhindern. 
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1 Introduction 
The observation of short-run high profits is not incompatible with the existence of a long-run 
competitive equilibrium. Prospective high profits are needed to provide incentives for innova-
tion or any other activity to improve the efficiency of a firm. However, it is expected that in 
the long-run excessive profits are competed away by reactions of the present competitors, and 
furthermore, that high profits attract entry, which is particularly important if the highly profit-
able firm has a dominant position and holds a large market share.  
In light of the mechanisms by which markets adjust, the absence of barriers to entry is funda-
mental for economic welfare. It is necessary that a situation of considerable market power 
with high profits attracts entry by challengers and that by this intensification of the competi-
tive pressure the profits adjust to a “normal” level.  
Economic theory has discussed extensively the conditions for barriers to entry and the effects 
thereof. Although there is no consensus about the exact definition of what a barrier to entry 
actually is, it is undeniable that barriers to entry play an important role in a wide variety of 
competition issues. Entry barriers can retard or even entirely prevent the working of a market 
and welfare may be seriously affected by them.  
There are quite a few empirical studies on the determinants of barriers to entry and also some 
on the effects of entry on profitability or other variables of interest, e.g. innovation. Martin 
(2002, 221) notes: “Another such strand is the argument, going back to Bain (1956) and re-
cently re-emphasized by Baumol et al. (1982), that market performance depends in an essen-
tial way on the importance of potential entry. The problem this raises for econometric work is 
that potential entry is an unobservable variable.” Usually, the effects of entry are identified by 
the realized entry of challengers. However, Martin (2002, 221) argues this is not a convincing 
way to model potential entry, as most actual entry is short and unsuccessful.  
Our contribution is a different one: We investigate the effect of the threat of entry. Informa-
tion from top managers, on their perception of how strong their own competitive position is 
threatened by a likely entry of competitors into their main markets, is applied to estimate what 
effect this threat of entry has on profitability.  
Aside of the value of using information on the perceived threat of entry we are able to identify 
the relevant markets as assessed by the managers themselves.  
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2 General Theoretical Considerations 
Entry and exit conditions are important factors that determine existing firms’ possibilities to 
exert market power. A dominant firm with a very high market share might not be able to 
make use of its position, if any significant deviation of the price from marginal costs will lead 
to entry by new competitors. Entry by new firms can also affect innovativeness and put pres-
sure on the existing firms not only to refrain from misusing their market power, but also to 
operate as efficiently as possible. Therefore, cost conditions might also improve. Hence mar-
ket shares and concentration are just one part of the story; in addition, the conditions for po-
tential competition are important contributors to the functioning of markets. 
A firm, deciding whether to penetrate a market or not, compares the benefits and costs of en-
try. The benefits are the expected profits and growth of demand connected with entry. The 
costs are, among other things, determined by barriers to entry, which may be caused by ex-
ogenous factors like economies of scale1 or by strategic factors like excess capacity, limit 
pricing or advertising.  
In the literature, the first important contribution to the discussion of entry barriers is Bain 
(1956). Following this a lively debate took place which, however, did not succeed in finding a 
generally accepted definition. Bain defined a barrier to entry by its effects on profitability, in 
particular in terms of the ability to earn above-normal profits without inducing entry. Stigler 
(1968) later defines an entry barrier as a cost advantage of incumbents over entrants and von 
Weizsäcker (1980) argues that a cost differential is only an entry barrier if it reduces welfare2. 
The discussed reasons for barriers to entry are manifold. Economies of scale may or may not 
be regarded as entry barriers. Clearly, with large scale economies there is only place for a few 
producers in an industry, and thus entry might be difficult. However, in the view of Baumol, 
Panzar and Willig (1982) it is the nature of the cost structure which determines entry barriers. 
In the absence of sunk costs, entry is not impeded and every firm presently active in the in-
dustry is disciplined by potential entry. Therefore, prices will be close to average costs. The 
problem is that in most industries a part of the costs will always be sunk.  
                                                 
1 Whether this is really a barrier to entry is debated. 
2 See McAfee, Mialon and Williams (2004) on this issue.  
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Excess capacity plays an important role in the theoretical discussion. Spence (1977), Dixit 
(1979, 1980), Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) are among the first to point out the 
asymmetry of an incumbent and a potential entrant. Typically, in such models the incumbent 
selects a level of capacity in the first period and the potential entrant and the incumbent simul-
taneously determine quantities in the second period. These models assume that the incumbent 
produces at or below the capacity limit in the second period and that the incumbent’s mar-
ginal costs are lower than the potential entrant’s marginal costs because the incumbent is able 
to avoid the costs associated with expanding capacity in the second period. Hence, the incum-
bent enjoys a first mover advantage.   
Another cause of entry barriers is product differentiation. Consumers view products as imper-
fect substitutes for a number of reasons, such as different varieties (horizontal product differ-
entiation) or product quality (vertical product differentiation). If introducing a new brand is 
connected with significant fixed costs, horizontal product differentiation may well lead to 
persistent entry barriers. Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) analyse a game where firms choose 
whether to enter at the first stage of the game, choose quality at the second stage and prices at 
the third stage. Surprisingly, they show in their model that only a few and at the limit only one 
firm will operate in the industry despite of free entry.  
Obviously, firms have an interest in product differentiation and they will attempt to increase 
the perceived difference or quality advantage of their products by the use of advertising. Ad-
vertising intends to increase consumers’ loyalty to specific brands, and therefore, to deter en-
try. Clearly, advertising expenditures are sunk costs and can as such increase the impediments 
to enter a market. This is the way advertising is introduced into the Sutton model. It can, how-
ever, also be argued that advertising informs consumers about the existence and the character-
istics of new products, and thus, eases entry.  
Another possible way of incumbents to raise entry barriers is by innovation. Bain (1956) al-
ready identifies absolute cost advantages as a major reason for entry barriers, and obviously, 
process innovation that aims at cost reductions. Secondly, newly developed products will lead 
to (at least temporary) advantages compared to competitors and therefore R&D activities can 
lead to reduced entry. At this point, it can also be argued in the opposite direction, as many 
entering firms are new foundations of innovators, who want to benefit from the market poten-
tial of their inventions. Hence innovativeness might spur entry and not impede it.  
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3 A Model with Fixed Costs 
We consider a representative firm i which competes with n-1 other producers in a Cournot 
oligopoly3. In addition to constant marginal costs c every firm has to cover fixed costs F, 
which are completely sunk4. The inverse demand function is defined in the following (stan-
dard) way: 
 (1)  i ip a bq b(n 1)q= − − − j
where the price demanded by firm i (pi) depends on the reservation price, the output level of 
firm i (qi) and the individual outputs of all other competitor firms j (qj) . All outputs are char-
acterized by the same price elasticity b. 
These assumptions lead to a simple profit function: 
(2) . i i j i i(a bq b(n 1)q )q cq Fπ = − − − − −
Optimizing this function with respect to output , and solving, assuming homogenous firms 
with identical output levels, leads to: 
iq
(3) p cq
b
−= = a bnq c
b
− − = a c
b(n 1)
−
+  
Equation (3) shows that the optimal output level q of every competitor depends negatively on 
the marginal costs c and on the number of firms n active in the market. 
Since a general assumption is that entry occurs until all profit is dissipated, we determine the 
optimal number of firms in a market by solving the zero profit condition. As firms’ sales (s) 
are identical, they can be defined as the average industry sales (S/n) determined by the opti-
mal output level q derived in equation (3). 
(4) S S a ccq F c F 0
n n b(n 1)
−− − = − − =+ . 
                                                 
3 Breshnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) and Berry (1992) discuss the relation between market size and the number 
of firms. Clearly, Sutton (1991, 1998) is also highly relevant if this question is considered. Cf. also the surveys  
by Berry and Reiss (2006) and  Sutton (2006). 
4 The assumption that all fixed costs are sunk is used for simplicity. Any sunk costs larger than zero would pro-
duce results similar to the ones presented below. If fixed costs are not sunk an entrant would not take them into 
account, as they can be recovered after leaving the industry. However in practice a part of capital will always be 
sunk. 
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Solving for n, leads to the following expression: 
(5) 
1
22 2 2Sb ac c bF ((Sb ac c bF) 4b FS)n
2bF
− + − + − + − +=
2
 
The industry sales volume S is simply defined as S=pnq. Replacing q by the optimal output 
determined by (3) and also including (3) into the inverse demand function (1) leads to: 
(6) 2
(a nc)n(a c)S pnq
b(n 1)
+ −= = + . 
This relation is inserted into the equation (5), and solving for n, leads to an explicit expression 
for the number of firms in a market (n): 
(7) a cn 1
bF
−= − +  
This relation implies that the maximal number of firms falls with a larger fixed costs F as well 
as with higher marginal costs c, and rises with a. More interesting, however, is the average 
firm size, as the costs have opposing effects: On the one hand in the absence of entry barriers 
higher costs lead to a lower output level. On the other hand fixed as well as marginal marginal 
costs restrict the number of firms and therefore increase the market shares of the existing 
firms. Hence, both the nominator and the denominator of n/S are affected by the cost condi-
tions and it remains unclear which effect dominates. The number of firms in an industry is 
determined by the following condition: 
(8)  1
2
n b
S bF c(bF)
= + . 
The number of firms in an industry is negatively affected by fixed costs F as well as by mar-
ginal costs c. Thus, this implies in turn that average firm size is positively affected by both F 
and c. Given that output is reduced if marginal costs c rise, this result is not self-evident. Sur-
prisingly, the constant term of the demand curve, a, has no effect on the maximal number of 
firms.  
The model is based on the assumption of entry until profits are dissipated. In such a scenario, 
by construction a connection between fixed costs and profitability cannot exist as profits are 
always zero. However, this is clearly the result of ignoring the integer constraint on the num-
ber of competitors n. If the integer condition is taken into account, raising fixed costs can lead 
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to higher profits as the size of the market may not be large enough to allow entry of an addi-
tional firm, but the incumbents earn positive profits.  
   
0 0n n
0 0
S Scq F 0 cq F
n n 1 +
− − > ≥ − −+ 1  
As an example, assume a-c=2 and b=F=1, which results in n=1 and 0π = . If fixed costs are 
now slightly reduced to 0.9, the new n connected with zero profits is 1.108. As this is not an 
integer, with n=1 the incumbent realises profits of 0.1. If entry occurs and n=2, profits be-
come negative. Hence, in this situation the incumbent takes profits and entry will not occur.  
This opportunity for positive profits will be larger, the higher the fixed costs are. Comparing 
the profit levels without ( ) and with entry (
0n
π
0n 1+π ) leads to: 
0 0
0 0
n n 1 2 2
0 0 0
(a n c)(a c) (a (n 1)c)(a c)c(a c) c(a c)
(n 1) b b(n 1) (n 2) b b(n 2)+
+ − + + −− −π − π = − − ++ + + 0 +
 
The derivative of this profit difference with respect to  is, as expected, negative. Hence the 
profit reduction induced by entry is decreasing in n. Clearly, the maximal number of firms n, 
which is compatible with non-negative profits, is decreasing in fixed costs F, and therefore, 
the potential for realising profits without attracting entry is increasing in F. The maximal 
number of firms is also decreasing in marginal costs.  
0n
4 Empirical Test 
We estimate two models. The first model analyzes the effect of entry threat on firm’s profit-
ability. The second model is based on the theoretical model derived in Section 3 and estimates 
the number of firms in dependence of fixed and marginal costs. In order to test our hypotheses 
on the threat of entry, we use firm level information from the Mannheim Innovation Panel 
(MIP). Data collection is carried out by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) 
on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The MIP provides annual in-
formation on innovative behaviour in the German manufacturing sector between 1992 and 
2005. The MIP is also the German contribution to the CIS, the European Community Innova-
tion Survey. Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics. 
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4.1 Threat of Entry and Profitability 
A number of empirical studies on barriers to entry already exist. They usually investigate the 
determinants of and/or impediments to market entry (and exit). Some also investigate the 
profitability effects. With respect to the latter relation, Amel and Liang (1997) find that new 
entrants in banking markets are attracted by high profits, market size and growth and that en-
try reduces market power in pricing. The studies on the determinants of entry barriers address 
the question of natural or strategic barriers like scale economies, excess capacity, limit pric-
ing, product differentiation by means of advertising or innovative activity. Furthermore, the 
benefits of entry into a particular market are regarded by taking account of expected profit-
ability and market growth5 6. The empirical evidence is quite supportive and unambiguous 
concerning profitability and market growth, but, in the summarizing view of Siegfried and 
Evans (1994), is much less convincing with respect to the other determinants like scale 
economies, excess capacity, limit pricing and product differentiation.  
The effect of the threat of entry on pricing behaviour, and therefore, also on profitability of 
firms is much less frequently investigated, although it has a strong rooting in theory. Harrod 
(1952) already suggests that if entry is easy, the incumbents will set prices close to average 
costs. This perception of the working of markets is also at the centre of the theory of Baumol, 
Panzar and Willig (1982). We intend to estimate the impact of perceived threat of entry on the 
profitability of companies. This perceived threat of entry is expected to determine the pricing 
behaviour of firms. Firms which are producing in easy-to-enter industries should be disci-
plined by this potential competition, even if entry does not occur in practice. Perhaps some 
firms will decide to optimize by maximizing short-run profits, and accept that in the long run 
entry takes place and profits will erode. This is basically Gaskins’ (1971) argument.   
Our empirical study investigates the determinants of profitability. The dependent variable is 
the profit margin. This variable is sometimes called excess return on sales and expresses the 
following: 
 i i- labor cost - capitalcost - materialcost=i i
i i
s
s s
iπ  
                                                 
5 A recent example is Berger, Bonime, Goldberg and White (2004). 
6 One could argue that the subjective assessment could also be based on the objectively observed frequent entry 
of challengers into a market. However this assertion is rejected by our empirical results. See below. 
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with πi denoting profits and  being firm (not industry) sales. If firms are in the long-run 
equilibrium and are operating within the range of their production functions with constant 
returns to scale, the excess profit return on sales will, on average across all products produced 
by the firm, equal the Lerner index. With constant returns to scale marginal costs (c) are equal 
to average costs (AC). One can therefore write: 
is
 − −= =pq ACq p c
s pq p
π  
with p being the price and q the quantity produced. Hence, our measure is the price-cost mar-
gin, where the capital costs have been subtracted and need not be taken into account by capital 
divided by sales as an explanatory variable as in other empirical models considering the price 
cost margin7. 
Table 1: Surveyed categories of the return on sales 
Return on sales Class   Return on sales Class  Return on sales Class  
< 0 % 0  (4 – 7%] 3  > 15% 6 
(0 – 2%] 1  (7-10%] 4  don't know 7 
(2 – 4%] 2  (10 – 15%] 5    
 
The categorical variable return on sales was included in the 2003 and 2005 surveys. The in-
formation is available for the years 2001 to 2004 because in both surveys firms were asked to 
state the return on sales for the two years preceding the survey year. Information on exports, 
the number of employees, sales and capital intensity has been taken from the respective 
waves. As can be seen in the descriptive statistics depicted in Table 2, the average firm gener-
ates between 2 and 7 % of return on sales as the mean represents the average category num-
ber. 
In the given context, the most important variable is the threat of entry. We use the threat and 
not the actually occurring entry rates as the explanatory variable because our main hypothesis 
is that the firms take action themselves to deter entry by reducing prices if entry is a definite 
possibility. Hence, the subjective assessment of the entry conditions is decisive, in our view, 
to explain profitability.  
                                                 
7 The usual way to estimate price-cost margins was introduced by Collins and Preston (1969). There are numer-
ous studies that follow the same methodology. 
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This seems to be one of the few cases where the use of subjective data is totally appropriate. 
The subjective impression of the managers concerning potential entry determines their pricing 
decisions and the resulting profitability. As stated above, the subjective assessment may be 
the result of observing that entry actually takes place, in which case there would be no differ-
ence between the objective situation and the subjective evaluation. The variable concerning 
entry is based on the following question: “Please indicate, in how far the following criteria 
describe the competitive situation in your main market: High threat to your firm’s market po-
sition by entry of new competitors”. The evaluations are rated on a four point Likert scale 
ranging from “fully applies” to “does not apply at all”.  We use a dummy variable, which as-
sumes unit value if a firm ticks the box “fully applies”. 
Clearly, any study analysing profitability has to carefully take into account the competitive 
situation in general. In our case, we do this in two different ways. We use information con-
cerning the relevant market supplied by the firms themselves. They were asked to evaluate 
how many main competitors they have. The options proposed for their assessments were 
“none”, “1 to 5”, “6 to 15” and “more than 15”. We compute a dummy variable called inter-
mediate competition, which has unit value if the firm chooses the option “6 to 15” and sec-
ondly a dummy variable called intensive competition if the firm chooses the option “more 
than 15”. We suppose that the evaluation of the situation by the firm itself offers a more accu-
rate representation of competitive pressure than conventional concentration indices.  
Next we take account of the size structure of the competitors. We use a dummy variable 
called competitors size, which has unit value, if a firm expresses that the competitors are pre-
dominantly larger than the firm itself. We have also information on the importance of price 
competition. Firms were asked to rank the importance of several characteristics of their com-
petitive environment (product quality, technical advancement, service, product variety, adver-
tising and price). If the option “price” was given the highest priority, we create a dummy vari-
able with unit value. This variable is called strong price competition. 
The questions on threat of entry and competition were only included in the year 2005 and 
represent the competitive situation in 2004. We conjecture that neither the threat of entry, nor 
competition, nor buyer power change much in the short-run. Therefore, we hold these vari-
ables constant over time for the observation period of 2001 to 2004. In Table 2, we find that 
about 14 % of the firms think that the market in which they operate is characterized by poten-
tial market entry. Over 13 % of the firms are exposed to intensive competition, in that they 
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face more than 15 competitors, and almost a third of the firms experience intermediate com-
petition and compete with 6 to 15 firms. Furthermore, more than 36 % of the firms face com-
petitors that are larger than themselves (competitors size). 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
RETURN ON SALES 2.341 1.716 0 6 
1/SALES** 0.295 0.479 0.000 5 
THREAT OF ENTRY 0.136 0.343 0 1 
INTENSIVE COMPETITION 0.134 0.341 0 1 
INTERMEDIATE 
COMPETITION 0.245 0.428 0 1 
COMPETITORS SIZE 0.361 0.480 0 1 
STRONG PRICE COMPETITION 0.487 0.500 0 1 
DEMAND GROWTH* 0.007 0.084 -0.624 0.885 
EXPORT 0.235 0.251 0 0.919 
IMPORT 0.251 0.134 0.060 0.712 
KAPINT 0.097 0.152 0.000 1.956 
SALARIES AND WAGES 72.100 30.830 9.779 195.583 
INDUSTRY SALES 361.738 1173.939 1.001 20777.96 
Log(EMPLOYEES) 4.379 1.538 1.609 10.971 
EAST 0.347 0.476 0 1 
 * Lagged values. 
** Sales is measured in thousand €. 
Another important impact factor for profitability linked to consumers is the market potential, 
which is often reflected by the lagged market demand growth proxied by the growth of sales 
at the three-digit industry level which is calculated as follows: 
 , 1
, 1
st s t
st
s t
S S
demand growth
S
−
−
−=  
where the demand growth in sector s at time t depends on the change in sales (S). As concerns 
the industry-level variable market demand, we combine information gathered in the biennially 
published report of the German Monopoly Commission which provides industry sales at the 
three-digit NACE level. Industry sales are used to compute each firm’s market share and sales 
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growth rates which proxy the demand growth and hence the market potential. Profitability as 
well as the need to react to potential entry also depends on the market potential, which is often 
reflected by the lagged market demand growth. The average firm faces a market demand 
growth of 0.7 % per year. 
More conventional control variables are the market share measured as the fraction of firm 
sales to 3-digit industry sales, the firm’s share of sales exported and industry imports divided 
by the sum of industry imports and industry production at 2-digit level (import) and the capi-
tal intensity kapint (capital fixed and working/number of employees). Clearly, all four vari-
ables are also used to represent the competitive environment of a firm and the industry. east is 
a dummy variable, which indicates that the firm is situated in the Eastern part of Germany 
(the former GDR). Finally, we add industry and time dummies, because other specific cir-
cumstances in an industry and/or cyclical factors, which perhaps are not reflected by our other 
variables, may affect the returns. 
In order to test the effects of potential entry on profitability we estimate an ordered probit for 
return on sales which is measured categorically as described in Table 1. As usual, in the con-
text of discrete choice, the model is based on a latent variable y* (here: profitability) being 
explained in a linear manner by 'x β . Since the latent variable is unobserved we rely on its 
surveyed categorical values. The econometric model can be written as, 
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As opposed to the usual ordered probit case, the cut-off points kμ  are known (see Table 1). 
Thus, the thresholds need not be estimated. Furthermore, by using the true threshold values 
we are able to identify the variance and to interpret the estimated coefficients as in a linear 
regression model, i.e. as marginal effects of the latent model (see Czarnitzki and Kraft 
(2004a,b) and Verbeek (2000) p. 192-195 for an example). 
Since heteroscedasticity will lead to inconsistent estimates we account for groupwise multi-
plicative heteroscedasticity of the form i iexp(z )σ = σ α  where z is a vector of variables sus-
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pected to cause heteroscedasticity. If heteroscedasticity is an issue in the ordered probit, α are 
additional coefficients to be estimated. In order to test if heteroscedasticity is an issue in our 
estimation, we perform LR tests. Heteroscedasticity is modelled by industry and time dum-
mies, by the east dummy and by firm size dummies. The LR tests show that that assumption 
of homoscedasticity has to be rejected.  
Table 3: Results for homo- and heteroscedastic ordered probits with known thresholds 
 Homosc. Heterosc. Homosc. Heterosc. 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
 (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) (Std.Err.) 
Threat of entry -0.006** -0.007*** -0.005* -0.005** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
intensive comp. -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
intermediate comp. -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
comp. size -0.005*** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
strong price comp.   -0.012*** -0.012*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
demand growtha 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Import 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Export 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
log(employees) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
capital intensity 0.013** 0.015** 0.014** 0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
East -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
industry dummies included included included included 
time dummies included included included included 
Sigma 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
log likelihood -6855.02 -6817.92 -6834.88 -6794.53 
χ2(all)a 199.10*** 216.09*** 157.66*** 166.91*** 
χ2(industries)b 41.98*** 92.49*** 43.36*** 89.06*** 
χ2(time)c 0.58 1.99 0.63 2.72 
LR-test(het.) d  80.71***  74.21*** 
joint sig.(het.) e  80.33***  73.35*** 
Number of obs. 3626 3626 3626 3626 
Notes: *** (**, *) indicate significance at 1 % (5 % , 10 %) level, a test of joint significance of all variables, b test of joint significance of 
industry dummies, c test of joint significance of time dummies d LR-test of heteroscedasticity, e test of significance of variables determining 
heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 3 displays the results of the ordered probit with known cut-off points. Our hypothesis 
that the threat of entry reduces profitability is confirmed. The results show a negative signifi-
cant effect of threat of entry on return on sales, and hence, disciplining effect with respect to 
setting above normal prices. 
Regarding the control variables, return on sales seems to be sensitive to market conditions. 
Profitability depends negatively on competition, either intensive or intermediate, and is nega-
tively influenced by the size of the competitors. This reflects the mechanism that stronger 
competitive pressure forces the firms to lower prices, and hence, to accept a reduction in re-
turn on sales. Price competition has also a negative impact on profitability. Notice, that the 
threat of entry has an independent effect aside of the number of competitors. Similarly, the 
threat of entry has an independent and additional impact if the variable price competition is 
included. This is not self-evident, as we hypothesize that the threat of entry leads to price re-
ductions, and therefore, a high correlation is probable. Furthermore, firms’ profitability is 
strengthened if other proxy variables standing for barriers to entry exist. We measure barriers 
to entry by firm’s capital intensity and find a positive effect on profitability. Moreover, the 
market potential is a crucial factor for firm profitability; demand growth has a significant 
positive effect on return on sales. And finally, exports generate higher return on sales. 
4.2 Number of Competitors in a Market 
One possible strategy to avoid entry could be to reduce prices to such an extent that entry is 
no longer profitable. If this were true, we would not observe a statistical association between 
the threat of entry and the number of competitors. The absence of entry barriers does not nec-
essarily imply a larger number of active competitors if incumbents act strategically.  
There is an interesting literature on the determinants of the number of firms active in an in-
dustry. Sutton (1991, 1998, 2006) develops a theory of a lower bound of concentration. He 
considers exogenous and endogenous barriers to entry. If entry barriers are largely exoge-
nously given, the minimum value of concentration tends to zero as market size increases. 
However, if fixed costs are endogenously determined by advertising and/or research and de-
velopment, Sutton predicts that the minimum equilibrium value of concentration is bounded 
from below. The equilibrium value of the number of firms is among other things determined 
by the toughness of competition, with a Bertrand oligopoly as the toughest market structure. 
  13
Breshanahan and Reiss (1991), Berry and Reiss (2006) discuss and estimate entry into small 
markets. They identify entry thresholds and ratios of entry thresholds revealing the nature of 
competition and the relevance of fixed costs. A recent empirical study on the relation between 
market size and the size distribution of firms is Campbell and Hopehayn (2005). 
The model developed in Section 3 shows that it is of utmost importance to identify n/S and 
not just n, as the number of active firms will usually but not necessarily rise with market size. 
In order to assess the size of the relevant market, we restrict our sample to those firms which 
indicate that their rivals are of similar size. This procedure implies that our dependent variable 
is , i.e. the inverse of individual firm salesi in /(n *s ) 1/ s=
                                                
8.  
As derived in the model in Section 3, the number of firms, which can survive in a market, is 
obviously also determined by cost conditions. Both fixed and marginal costs are expected to 
reduce the number of firms. These costs are approximated by capital intensity kapint (reflect-
ing the extent of fixed costs) and the average salaries and wages per employee including the 
firms’ contributions to social security (representing marginal costs).  
It cannot be excluded that we may encounter endogeneity problems. Schmalensee (1989) ar-
gues that cross sectional studies are prone to simultaneity problems and our approach might 
not be free of such feed back relations. However, it is impossible to find reliable instrumental 
variables. On the other hand, it seems to be quite unlikely that endogeneity is responsible for 
our main results.  
As described above, Sutton (1991, 1998, 2006) emphasises the role of toughness of price 
competition on the number of competitors. If competitive pressure is strong, as in the case of 
Bertrand behaviour, fewer firms are supported in equilibrium, as a greater increase in market 
size is required for an additional profitable entry to take place. This hypothesis is tested by 
our variable strong price competition, defined similarly as in the last section.  
Sutton also points to a non-linear relation between the number of firms and industry size, as 
output per firm is expected to rise with total industry sales. However, a test on this hypothesis 
is not trivial in our case. We have no exact information on the number of firms active in an 
 
8 This variable is thus directly comparable to the dependent variable establishments’ sales, used by Campell and 
Hopenhayn (2005).  
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industry, but instead use the responses to our alternative categories. These answers are now 
used to approximate the number of firms in the following way: If a firm indicates that it has 1 
to 5 main competitors, we compute the total number by adding to the average number of 3 
competitors the interviewed firm itself, which results in a total of 4 firms active in the respec-
tive industry. If a firm states that it has 6-15 main competitors, our estimate of the industry 
structure amounts to a total of 11 companies. Finally, if a firm chooses to tick the option 
“more than 15 competitors”, we take 20 as a rough “guesstimate” of the total number of ac-
tive firms. These figures are multiplied by the sales of the responding firm. Clearly, this pro-
cedure is somewhat arbitrary, but we see no alternative method to test for a possible non-
linear relation between market size and the number of firms.   
As before, we add nine industry dummies to control for specific circumstances characterizing 
a market. The dummy variable east is included, as the firms in the new Bundesländer (the 
former GDR) are on average younger and smaller than their Western counterparts. 
Our test of the impact of potential entry on the number of competitors in a market is based on 
OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Estimation results are presented in Table 5. It 
turns out that the threat of entry is not associated with a significantly higher number of com-
petitors. Hence, the threat alone is sufficient to induce the incumbents to cut prices to such an 
extent that entry is no longer profitable. As shown in the section on profitability, taking into 
account the independent effect of the number of competitors, the threat of entry implies sig-
nificantly reduced profits and this reduction in profitability seems to be sufficient to avoid any 
occurrence of entry. The insignificance of the coefficient of entry threat is very robust and 
does also not alter if, for instance, the variables considered in the profitability equation are 
additionally included. This outcome of our empirical study also offers evidence against the 
possibility that the firms base their assessment of the existence of entry barriers on the mere 
observation that entry actually occurs.   
Our cost variables have the expected effects and are both significant. We find evidence for a 
non-linear relation between industry size and the number of companies. Furthermore, we find 
a strong impact of price competition on the total number of competitors which supports our 
conjecture that Bertrand competition leads to a smaller number of firms in a market. 
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Table 5: OLS Regressions for the  Number of Firms Active in a Market 
 Coeff. 
(Std.Err.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.Err.)  
Coeff. 
(Std.Err.) 
THREAT OF ENTRY 0.041 (0.051) 
0.054 
(0.051) 
0.058 
(0.051) 
STRONG PRICE 
COMPETITION  
-0.086*** 
(0.030) 
-0.086*** 
(0.030) 
INDUSTRY SALES   -1,9* *** 
(4.9* ) 
5e−
6e−
KAPINT -0.098*** (0.021) 
-0.094*** 
(0.021) 
-0.084*** 
(0.022) 
SALARIES AND WAGES -0.380*** (0.052) 
-0.380*** 
(0.052) 
-0.371*** 
(0.053) 
EAST 0.043 (0.035) 
0.053** 
(0.034) 
0.051 
(0.034) 
CONSTANT 1.699*** (0.200) 
1.739*** 
(0.202) 
1.710*** 
(0.204) 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES included included  included 
TIME DUMMIES included included included 
2R  0.166 0.167 0.171 
F(all)a 20.85*** 19.84*** 19.21*** 
F(industry)b 18.61*** 18.74*** 17.69*** 
F(time)c 0.12 0.11 0.12 
Number of Observations 2366 2366 2366 
  Notes: *** (**, *) indicate significance at 1 % (5 % , 10 %) level, a test of joint significance of   
  all variables, b test of joint significance of industry dummies, c test of joint significance of time   
  dummies. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper reports the results of a study which employs rarely available variables. We investi-
gate the effects of the perceived threat of entry on profitability and the number of competitors. 
The entry threat leads to lower profits, and the reduction in profits is sufficient to make entry 
unattractive, as our variable entry threat is actually not associated with a higher number of 
firms.  
While subjective data is usually criticised for its limited reliability, we think it is quite useful 
in the present context. The subjective assessment of managers concerning the characteristics 
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of the markets in which their firms operate will determine firm behaviour. Obviously, the 
view of the managers may eventually later turn out to have been wrong, but nevertheless the 
individual evaluation serves as the basis of their decisions.   
The observed market structure and market performance are among other things determined by 
strategic decisions of firms. This paper aims to identify one reason for strategic behaviour of 
firms and the consequences thereof. Clearly, there is much scope left for additional research 
on the decisions of firm managers in situations of imperfect competition, but it is very diffi-
cult to observe not only the outcome but also the reasons for market conduct. 
It is obvious that much of the analysis could be improved by the use of panel data. Before-
after comparisons would help to solve or attenuate the diverse endogeneity and causality is-
sues, which can hardly be totally avoided in the case of cross-sectional data. However we 
make use of very specific variables and we are glad to have them at all, and a panel is proba-
bly too much to ask for at the present time.  
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